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DECISION / RESOLVE†
Decision/Resolve [afgjøre/beslutte–verb; Afgjørelse/Beslutning–noun]
The  Danish  verbs  afgjøre and  beslutte  have  overlapping  definitions. 
The former means to decide, determine, or settle something.  The latter, 
when  used  in  the  phrase  at  beslutte  sig,  means  to  make  up  one’s 
mind  or  arrive  at  a  decision.   In  this  sense,  it  signals  (like  afgjøre) 
the end of a process of deliberation. However,  beslutte also conveys 
the idea of resolve, which points to an ongoing commitment to think and 
act in a certain way. 
The  word  “decision”  is  found  most  often  in  Concluding 
Unscientific  Postscript  and  Philosophical  Fragments  (under  the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus), followed by Two Ages and Works and 
Love (eponymous). The term “resolve” likewise appears most frequently 
in Climacus’ writings, followed by  Either-Or, and then  Stages on Life’s  
way.  Some  salient  remarks  can  also  be  found  in  the  Notebooks. 
Kierkegaard,  for  the  most  part,  stays  close  to  and  builds  upon  the 
ordinary meanings of these words. While they are not the subject of long 
reflection  like  “love,”  say,  or  “irony,”  Kierkegaard  does give  them an 
existential  coloring  that  sets  them off sharply from speculative thinking 
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as a  whole  (1).  His  non-cognitivism is  further  brought  out  by linking 
“decision” and “resolve” to the notions of “will” (2), decisionism (3), “the 
Moment” (4), and “the stages” (5).
(1) Existential vs. Cognitive. Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge 
both the distinct and overlapping meanings of the terms “decision” and 
“resolve.” He stakes out a semantic range for these concepts that he 
then contrasts sharply against both systematic speculation and thought 
in general. This may be summarized as follows: 
“Decision”
(a) refers primarily to real or essential (væsentlig) decision, which
is related to the eternal and so is absolute.1   
(b) happens in time,2 in the medium of existence, and is rooted in
subjectivity rather than in systematic speculation, public
debate, voting, deliberation, or reflection.3
(c) requires a leap4 in the moment.5
(d) is passionate, qualitative, involving the will.6
(e) is required for faith.7
1 SKS 7, 39, 43, 96, 350 / CUP1, 33, 37, 98, 384.
2 SKS 7, 93 / CUP1, 95.
3 SKS 7, 39, 112, 121, 178, 186, 202-203, 311, 443 / CUP1, 33, 115-6, 129, 194, 203, 221-2, 341, 488; 
SKS 8, 66-67 / TA, 68; SKS 23, 246; SKS 24, 239-40 / JP 4, 4203.         
4 SKS 7, 100, 347 / CUP1, 102, 381.
5 SKS 4, 260-2, 306 / PF, 57-61, 111. 
6 SKS 7, 48, 94, 280, 311, 347-348 / CUP1, 42, 95, 307-8, 341, 381.
7 SKS 7, 24, 545 / CUP1, 15, 601.
“Resolve”
(a′) is also understood chiefly in relation to the eternal and is
absolute as well.8
(b′) is found in subjectivity or individuality and is opposed to
speculation, deliberation, and reflection, being that which
begins and stops all human thinking.9
(c′) is related to the moment.10
(d′) involves the will.11
(e′) is required for faith.12
“Resolve” can also mean: 
(f) Power, firmness, single-mindedness.13
This  scheme  raises  some  key  questions.  Both  “decision”  and 
“resolve” are closely tied to the will. But how exactly do they fit with this  
concept and why the stark dichotomy between will and reason? Second, 
how do we reconcile their eternal form with their taking place in time, 
and how is this tied to faith again?  
8 SKS 7, 450 / CUP1, 497.
9 SKS 7, 41, 109-110, 112, 174, 450  / CUP1, 35, 112-3, 116, 189, 497.  
10 SKS 4, 232 / PF, 24-5.
11 SKS 3, 64 / EO2, 58-9; SKS 7, 127 / CUP1, 136.
12 SKS 7, 174, 450 / CUP1, 189, 497.
13 SKS 7, 319, 420 / CUP1, 349, 462-3. Cf. SKS 20, 212 / KJN 4, 211; SKS 21, 121 / JP 1, 962; SKS 24, 
289 / JP 2, 1269.    
(2) The Will. Decision and resolve are clearly voluntary in nature 
and, as we have seen, tied to willing. Generally speaking, “decision” is 
more  about  choosing  or  settling  an  issue;  “resolve”  is  more  about 
strong-mindedness  and  staying  power.  Kierkegaard  is  not  all  that 
interested  in  the  physiological  and  psychological  aspects  of  the  will. 
Instead,  he  focuses  narrowly  on  one  specific  thing:  Existential 
orientation  or  choice.  What  this  means  is  that  decision  and resolve, 
properly understood, are not about psychological or bodily states, but 
rather about choosing an orientation, i.e. a way of seeing and relating to 
one’s life as a whole, and then sticking by this choice.14
(3) Decisionism. Kierkegaard’s take on the will, and by extension 
decision and resolve, is voluntarist. He strongly denies that either is an 
expression or epiphenomenon of the human intellect or practical reason. 
It is the will that moves and actualizes the understanding, not the other 
way around. And since decision has less to do with plural choice and 
more about going for a broader existential orientation in life, there is also 
less  scope  for  concrete  deliberation.  For  Kierkegaard,  it  seems, 
everyone just knows what is the right thing to do in a given context, so 
no  real  ethical  dilemmas calling  for  deliberation  are  even  possible.15 
Finally, in an existential-religious sense, careful reflection is actually a 
way  of  dodging  decision—being  irresolute.16 A  good  case  could  be 
14 Cf. SKS 3, 165-6 / EO2, 169; SKS 18, 223 / KJN 2, 205. 
15 E.g. Pap. X A 169 / JP 3, 2874.     
16 SKS 3, 166 / EO2, 169; SKS 10, 95-98 / CD VII, 88-90.
made then for human reason not playing a positive, integral role in the 
Kierkegaardian corpus at all. Real choices always involve a leap. Seen 
in this light, Kierkegaard is a decisionist.  
  
(4)  The Moment. True decision and resolve, as we have seen, 
are eternal and absolute but also happen in time. This is really only a 
problem  if  we  think  the  human  being  is  self-sufficient  in  all  things 
involving  truth,  or  that  there  is  no  way  to  unify  time  and  eternity.  
Kierkegaard, along with his pseudonyms, reject both assumptions. As a 
freely operating cause and a self-relation the will is both spontaneous 
and free, but as relational it is always limited by something beyond itself. 
Though the self is a synthesis of freedom and necessity, this synthesis 
is,  paradoxically,  never  achieved by the self  in isolation.17 Something 
outside  the  individual’s  own  thought  and  will  must  give  the  criterion 
(truth-condition) for real, existential choice and resolve to happen, or at 
least  force  the  individual  to  engage  in  the  first  place.18 Only  in  the 
Moment are true decisions made and determination shown, the Moment 
being that which unifies eternity and time in itself.19 That is why true 
decision and resolution are never quite up to the individual alone.     
           (5) The Stages. The lowest form of choice is aesthetic. That is, in 
the aesthetic  stage of life the individual  is  focused only on choosing 
17 Cf. SKS 11, 129-30 / SUD, 13-14. 
18 Cf. SKS 4, 258-71 / PF, 55-71.
19 Cf. SKS 4, 242-53 / PF, 37-48.
between different options in concrete situations, and on inventing and 
trying  out  different  life-projects  or  self-images.  This  is  because  the 
aesthete imagines she is self-sufficient and absolute. Such a person is a 
mere  observer  of  life,  lost  in  plurality.20 The  next  form  of  choice  is 
ethical, which is more engaged. The ethical individual realizes she is a 
relational being, tied to others, and she tries to act on this insight in a 
responsible way.21 This is bound to fail, however, since she is still trying 
to unify freedom and necessity  in herself—in her own thought and will 
(moral  autonomy).22 Neither  in  its  aesthetic  nor  ethical  form  is  the 
existential nature of choice acknowledged or resolve truly demonstrated. 
Only  when  human  self-sufficiency  is  given  up  does  the  individual 
become open to eternity,  the absolute (God).23 Only when the eternal 
condition (truth-criterion) has been given in time by God is she able to 
make a leap of faith in the Moment.24 Only when the individual is helped 
by God to will  and endure Eternity is resolve actually achieved.25 For 
Kierkegaard, decision or resolve in its true, existential form is religious—
i.e. Christian.
 
20 Cf. SKS 3, 163-4 / EO2, 166-7.
21 Cf. SKS 3, 163-4 / EO2, 166-7; SKS 7, 290-3 / CUP1, 318-321.
22 Cf. SKS 23, 45-6 / JP 1, 188.
23 Cf. SKS 4, 140-7 / FT, 45-53; SKS 7, 477ff.; 505-10 / CUP1, 525ff.; 555-61.
24 Cf. SKS 4, 161-2 / FT, 69; SKS 7, 97 / CUP1, 98-9.
25 Cf. SKS 8, 123, 157, 169, 182; 184ff., 227-37 / UD 7, 46, 60, 74, 76ff., 127-39.   
To sum up: Decision and resolve involve making a determination, 
with the only real difference between them being that decision is about 
making a choice, while resolve is about sticking by it. Kierkegaard has 
an existentialist take on this: Decision and resolve are more about an 
individual’s choosing and committing to a total  way of looking at and 
relating  to  life  than to  concrete  or  situational  choice.  The  motivating 
element in all thought and action, decision and resolve are tied to the 
will,  essentially  cut  loose  from  systematic  speculation  and  public 
deliberation—indeed, from human reason as a whole. True decision or 
resolve has a religious, Christian form: It is a leap of faith in the Moment, 
empowered and sustained by God.
See  also:  existence/existential;  immediacy/reflection;  leap;  politics; 
reason;  religious/  Religiousness;  stages;  time/temporality/eternity; 
voting; will.
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